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A considerable literature seems to argue the use of person trade-
o⁄s to estimate the quality-adjustment factor in Quality-Adjusted Life
Years (QALY) models. A similar practise is followed by the WHO
to estimate the disability weights used in calculation of Disability-
Adjusted Life Years (DALY) for assessment of region- and disease-
speci￿c burden of disease. In this note we show that QALY (and
DALY) models based on person trade-o⁄ scores generally violate the
Pareto principle.
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11 Introduction
It seems widely recognized in the literature that a social policy of maximizing
the sum of health related individual utilities may fail to capture social prefer-
ences for treating the severely ill before the less severely ill. The speci￿c inter-
pretation of individual utility is here Quality-Adjusted Life Years (QALYs)
where the quality-adjustment factor re￿ ects how an individual trades o⁄im-
provements in health state versus gains in life years (e.g. Wagsta⁄[36], Dolan
[4], Bleichrodt [2], Nord [21], ￿sterdal [39]). Individual time trade-o⁄ and
standard gamble scores are examples of data used for estimating the quality-
adjustment factor.
A number of papers in the last decade have proposed, or have been
strongly in￿ uenced by, a speci￿c method for integrating social preferences in
the QALY framework (e.g. Nord [17][18][19][20], Nord et al. [22], Richardson
and Nord [29], Dolan and Green [5], Ubel et al. [34], and Schwarzinger et
al [31]). In this method the quality-adjustment factor is estimated from per-
son trade-o⁄ scores, i.e. estimates of the number people that should receive
a speci￿ed health improvement (for example one extra life year at a cer-
tain health state) so that it is equally socially preferred to a ￿xed number of
other people receiving a given health improvement (for example one extra life
year in perfect health). Likewise, the Disability-Adjusted Life Years (DALY)
model used by the World Health Organization (WHO) for assessment of
region- and disease-speci￿c burden of disease1 is also based on disability
weights (where 0 indicates ￿perfect health￿and 1 indicates ￿equivalent to
death￿ ) estimated by person trade-o⁄ protocols [37] (for details, see Murray
and Lopez [15]).
Despite the popularity of health indices based on person trade-o⁄s, the-
1One DALY can be thought of as one lost year of ￿healthy￿ life and the burden of
disease as a measurement of the gap between the current health of a population and an
ideal situation where everyone in the population lives into old age in full health ([37], p.
95).
2oretical support for its use in a QALY (or DALY) framework has not been
investigated (Dolan [4], Green [8], Mansley and Elbasha [11]).
In this note, we consider a standard QALY model and show that if the
quality-adjustment factor is constructed from person trade-o⁄ scores, then
social welfare functions based on aggregation of QALYs generally violate the
Pareto principle.
Our focus is the QALY framework due to its simplicity and popularity
and since it is well-founded in standard decision models (e.g. Bleichrodt [3],
Miyamoto et al. [13], Miyamoto [12], ￿sterdal [39]). The issue raised in this
note does, however, also apply to the DALY framework which is a variation of
the use of QALYs for social welfare assessment, and the same basic problems
are present with the use of person trade-o⁄methods to estimate the disability
weights.
The paper is structured as follows: In the next section we de￿ne the
basics and give two possible de￿nitions of person trade-o⁄ indices. Section
3 presents the main result, and discuss implications. An example illustrates
that a combination of individual time trade-o⁄s and person trade-o⁄s can
be needed for estimating relevant parameters. Finally, Section 4 discusses
extensions and limitations and contains a concluding remark.
2 Basics
We consider the simplest possible QALY model ([39]). We assume that health
states are constant over time. A health pro￿le for person i is a pair (ai;ti)
where ai is a health state, and ti ￿ 0 is the number of life years at ai. Let
%i be binary relation representing person i￿ s preferences for health pro￿les.
We assume that for any health state ai the individual preference relation
%i is continuous in ti, and no health state is equivalent to death in the sense
that there is not a non-degenerate interval of life years for which any number
of life years within this interval is equally preferred. Further, we assume for
3simplicity that there is a health states a￿ (called ￿perfect health￿ ) such that
(a￿
i;ti) %i (ai;ti) for all ai and ti.
For a ￿nite population of n individuals, a social preference relation %
is de￿ned on distributions of individual health pro￿les. A social welfare






























when (ai;ti) %i (a0
i;t0
i) for all i and (ai;ti) ￿i (a0
i;t0
i) for some i.
There are two basic variants of person trade-o⁄s. The ￿rst variant involves
￿xed health states and hypothetical gains in life years. The respondent is for
example presented with some health state a; and considers how many people
k(a) at health state a that should gain one life year before it from a societal
point of view is equally preferred to one life year to thousand people at perfect
health. The quality-adjustment factor is then de￿ned as p1(a) = 1000
k(a): More




> > > > > > <


















k z }| {
(a;1);:::;(a;1);







> > > > > > =
> > > > > > ;
: (1)
The second variant involves a trade-o⁄between gains in life years for one
group of people and improvements in health for another group of people. For
4example, we may consider an initial distribution
2
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and determine the number of people k living for one year that should be
taken from health states a to perfect health so that it from a societal point
of view is equally preferred to taking thousand people from death to perfect
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One may notice that p1(a) or p2(a) might be empty sets (due to an integer
problem or due to that indi⁄erence cannot be established for any k), or
multiple-valued (in case that social welfare is not monotonic in individual
utility). In the following, we disregard these technical issues and consider a
given real-valued person trade-o⁄ index.2
The potential gain in life years (￿1￿ ) and the number of people at perfect
health (￿1000￿ ) is arbitrarily selected in this construction, but the idea is
that we can formulate assumptions ensuring that in principle an arbitrary
choice can be made (disregarding the integer problem).
2A third variant of person trade-o⁄s involves ￿xed lifetime and improvements of health
states. This method is, however, unable to reveal trade-o⁄s between gains in life years
and improvements in health.
53 Pareto e¢ cient health-related social wel-
fare evaluation
Despite the importance of the Pareto principle for the construction of a theo-
retically sound outcome measure based on person trade-o⁄s, its implications
in this context seems to have been neglected the literature.3
Theorem Let the social welfare function be the sum of QALYs in the pop-
ulation where the index p (for example a person trade-o⁄ index p1 or p2) is






Then the Pareto principle is satis￿ed if and only if every individual￿ s prefer-
ences are represented by a linear QALY function and the quality-adjustment










Proof: If every individual￿ s preferences are represented by a linear QALY











for all (ai;ti) and (a0
i;t0
i); then U satis￿es the Pareto principle: If (ai;ti) %i
(a0
i;t0
i) for all i with strict preference for at least some i then p(ai)ti ￿ p(a0
i)t0
i
3For related work see however Kaplow and Shavell [10], ￿sterdal [39], Hasman and
￿sterdal [9].
6for all i and p(ai)ti > p(a0
i)t0






















for all i. We therefore show that if (4) does not hold, then the Pareto principle




















for some (ai;ti) and (a0
i;t0
i):






















which contradicts the Pareto principle.
If (5) holds then if (ai;ti) ￿i (a0
i;t0
i) we have (6) and the argument above
applies. Hence assume that (ai;ti) ￿i (a0
i;t0
i): Since p(ai)ti < p(a0
i)t0
i it is clear
that ti > 0 or t0
i > 0. Hence by the non-equivalence-to-death assumption
7there is " su¢ ciency close to zero such that either
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for arbitrary (aj;tj), all j 6= i; contradicting the Pareto principle. Q.E.D.
The theorem explicates the limitations with use of person trade-o⁄s in
QALY models: If (3) is the criterion used for (health-related) evaluation
then only if individual preferences are symmetric and linear and the person
trade-o⁄ index coincides with the individual quality-adjustment index this
social welfare function is consistent with the Pareto principle.
We shall not argue against the symmetry assumption, since it may well
be reasonable under limited information, and the preference foundations for
linearity have been discussed elsewhere ([3][13][39]). However, since the point
of departure of the QALY literature proposing person trade-o⁄based indices
was, or is, that such indices and individual quality-adjustment indices mea-
sure two di⁄erent things (which they in fact also do in the general model), and
since experiments have indicated considerable discrepancies between these in-
dices ([26][29][27]), inherent in this approach therefore is a con￿ ict with the
Pareto principle. Even assuming that QALYs can be used for representa-
tions of individual and societal preferences, making use of a model such as
(3) has no theoretical justi￿cation and may lead to suboptimal health care
8distribution.
The whole idea of establishing a person trade-o⁄ index only makes sense
if the underlying social preference relation preferences satis￿es anonymity
and independence across individuals, i.e. if social welfare can be evaluated










the two person trade-o⁄ indices coincide4;5, as well as being independent of
the speci￿c parameters selected (i.e. ￿1￿year and ￿1000￿people). But note
that if (8) is used for (health-related) social welfare assessment then again





















j 1000 = k(1 ￿ f(a))
￿
= f(a):
5A recent paper by Mansley and Elbasha [11] raised a critique of forcing consistency
of p1 and p2 in the sense that 1000
p1 = 1￿ 1000
p2 in elicitation procedures used for estimating
the health index to be used in a DALY model. However, the critique was not based on a
DALY (or QALY) model, but rather based on the observation that this consistency check
would not apply under some alternative welfare criteria. However, these criteria were
themselves inconsistent with the Pareto principle, and, contrary to the authors￿claim, not
in accordance with standard welfare functions applied to health (as in [36]). For details,
see ￿sterdal [40].
9only if individual preferences are linear and the time trade-o⁄indices coincide
with the person trade-o⁄index this social welfare function is consistent with
the Pareto principle.
If (8) is not the underlying social welfare function, there is no reason to
expect that the two person trade-o⁄ indices coincide, and these indices will
not be independent of the parameter indicating the gain in life years (i.e. ￿1￿
year). In particular, for social welfare evaluations the information contained
in the person trade-o⁄ index is a supplement to, but cannot replace, the
information on individual preferences that is contained in time trade-o⁄s.
For a simple illustration, suppose that individual preferences are symmet-






where ￿ > 0 is a parameter which re￿ ects the degree of aversion towards
inequality:6 De￿ning the time trade-o⁄ index h as
h(a) = ft j (a
￿;t) ￿i (a;1)g;
then f is positive linear transformation of h, and we can use time trade-o⁄
scores h(a) as quality-adjustment factor f(a).
Now, consider a health state a, and assume that h(a) = 1
2, and p1(a) =
1000
1500 = 2











which gives 1000 = 1500(1






6See e.g. Wagsta⁄ [38], Dolan [4] and Williams [38] for examples of the Bergson family
of social welfare functions applied to QALYs. For an axiomatic characterization, see
￿sterdal (2002).
104 Discussion and conclusion
The assumptions made, a deterministic framework with chronic health states,
was mainly for ease of exposition and for being able to point to the fact that
a con￿ ict with the Pareto principle has nothing to do with complications
related to uncertainties and non-chronic health states.7
The DALY model does technically not come under the analysis in the
previous section because of variations in its de￿nition that (among other
things) involves a special form of age-weighting and discounting. But it has
exactly the same problems as the QALY with use of a person trade-o⁄index
synonymous with quality-adjustment factors (here called disability weights).
Such practise has no underlying theoretical justi￿cation and, assuming that
the DALY model is intended to measure a welfare loss, an inconsistency with
the Pareto principle can be shown in an entirely analogous way.8
We have deliberately not imposed any speci￿c interpretation of ￿life
years￿which enters the de￿nition of a health pro￿le. The usual interpretation
is that life years involved are gains relative to some status quo distribution
(which may or may not have been speci￿ed), but it could also refer to the
total number of life years for individuals. It is worth noticing that under the
former interpretation handling person trade-o⁄s and time trade-o⁄s is actu-
ally not easy as the estimates will be related to status quo biases (Tversky
and Kahneman [32], Dolan and Robinson [6], Munro and Sugden [14]).
7Variations of the theorem could be formulated under more general structural assump-
tions along these dimensions.
8We focus in this paper on person trade-o⁄ based indices. Related procedures called
veil-of-ignorance methods have also recently drawn some attention (e.g. Murray et al.[16],
Nord [23], Pinto-Prades and AbellÆn-PerpiæÆn [27]). Although these methods may refer
to a probabilistic framework which is di⁄erent from ours (depends on the speci￿c inter-
pretation of the questions involved), the same basic problem is present with the use of a
veil-of-ignorance based index as quality-adjustment factor in a QALY model (or disability
weight in a DALY model). An interesting recent experiment [27] has indicated that a
veil-of-ignorance based index is closer to an individual quality-adjustment factor than a
person trade-o⁄ based index, which therefore in this respect reduces the potential con￿ ict
with the Pareto principle.
11It should be emphasized that our critique is not of person trade-o⁄s per
se, but of the way it has been proposed integrated with the QALY framework.
Not all papers concerned with person trade-o⁄s have suggested this speci￿c
application of person trade-o⁄s, and our critique does of course not relate to
the papers where QALY or DALY models play only a minor role (if any); e.g.
Patrick et al. [25], Olsen [24], Pinto Prades [26], Pinto Prades and Lopez-
NicolÆs [28], Ubel et al. [33], Baron et al. [1], Green [8], Rodr￿guez-M￿guez
and Pinto Prades [30], Ubel et al. [35], Dolan and Tsuchiya [7].
In parts of the QALY literature there has been an unfortunate lack of ex-
plicitness with regard to the models underlying analysis and argument. This
means that, although we have been unable to ￿nd alternative interpreta-
tions of the approach of the papers considering person trade-o⁄s for use in a
QALY framework (i.e. [17][18][19][20][22][29][5][34][31]), there is some room
for interpretation, and further debate can add clari￿cation and nuances.
It is perhaps the case, however, that a forward looking research strat-
egy will be most fruitful. Theoretically founded future empirical studies can
potentially shed much more lights on the relevance of person trade-o⁄s esti-
mates in connection with QALY-based methods for decision aid in program
evaluation.
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